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HAVE YOU NO SENSE OF DECENCY?*
PETER J. NEUFELD**
I. INTRODUCTION
This essay on forensic DNA litigation focuses on the practical
problems which arise when two dissimilar disciplines-science and
law-collide in court. My experience as defense counsel in four
cases' focusing on DNA evidence, 2 as a consultant in dozens more,
and as an observer of the manner in which scientific evidence, and
DNA evidence in particular, is processed by the courts, compels the
conclusion that practitioners need to scrutinize evidence more care-
fully before making case-dispositive decisions. Further, our society
needs a comprehensive regulatory scheme to protect defendants,
crime victims, and the rest of us from shoddy laboratory practices
which can generate unreliable results. Not only does DNA evidence
often go unchallenged and unregulated; this article will describe
how, when a serious challenge is made, some prosecutors and the
FBI also have actively and improperly interfered with the scientific
debate over the limitations and reliability of DNA evidence. Finally,
this article will expose the hypocrisy of prosecutors who relish DNA
testing as a tool to convict, but bristle when such evidence is offered
by an unjustly convicted prisoner to prove his innocence.
* The late SenatorJoseph McCarthy and his counsel Roy Cohn were both revered
and reviled for their eagerness to resort to character assassination to thwart their
adversaries. One day, during the Army-McCarthy hearings, they went too far. A young
lawyer associated with Joseph Welch, counsel to the Army, was publicly denounced for
his membership years earlier in the National Lawyers Guild. Welch's tearful but stinging
rebuke precipitated McCarthy's fall from grace: "Have you no sense of decency, sir, at
long last? Have you no sense of decency?" NicHoLAs VON HOFFMAN, CITIZEN COHN 237
(1988). As this article will demonstrate, some prosecutors also have resorted to
unprincipled attacks.
** Private Practitioner; Co-chair, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers'
DNA Task Force; Adjunct Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.A.,
University of Wisconsin, 1972; J.D., New York University Law School, 1975.
1 In each of these four cases, my colleague and co-chair of the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Barry C. Scheck, served with me as counsel.
2 People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); United States v. Yee, 134
F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991); People v. Kotler, No. Cr. 2480-81 (Suffolk Co., N.Y. Sup.




Currently, there are no enforced standards or programs to en-
sure the quality of proffered DNA evidence. Practitioners rarely at-
tempt to cultivate an adequate appreciation of the limitations of the
scientific evidence. For instance, according to my calculations, over
the last five years the Federal Bureau of Investigation has produced
DNA results in more than 10,000 criminal cases. Notwithstanding a
few well-publicized admissibility hearings, the reality is that in fewer
than two percent of the cases have there been pretrial hearings chal-
lenging the reliability of the evidence. Based upon my own informal
poll of public defenders and scientists, in fewer than five percent of
the cases where DNA test results were inculpatory did defense coun-
sel bother to seek an independent assessment. For the vast majority
of criminal prosecutions, with or without DNA evidence, there are
no trials and no pretrial hearings-only plea bargains.
Usually, in cases where the genetic evidence is the core of the
case, if a DNA laboratory declares a match, the defendant pleads
guilty; if a laboratory excludes the accused, the prosecution is
aborted in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. 3 Thus, practi-
tioners must not unquestioningly accept the quality of the DNA evi-
dence before embarking on a non-trial disposition of the case. The
lawyer must first have a fundamental grasp of the science and its
application to crime scene evidence before retaining an expert to
independently assess the quality of the results.4 Continuing legal
education programs and acquisition of the National Research Coun-
cil's report entitled "DNA Technology in Forensic Science" is an
excellent place to start.
In addition to teaching lawyers the absolute necessity of inde-
pendently evaluating an opponent's evidence, we must have regula-
tion and external oversight of the laboratories to protect not only
defendants but crime victims and the general public from the risk of
having cases wrongfully adjudicated on the basis of inferior labora-
tory practices.
The FBI and some prosecutors decry the need for external
oversight. They concede that clinical laboratories need government
regulation, but argue that forensic laboratories do not because fo-
rensic evidence is adequately tested in the crucible of court. But not
3 Some prosecutors have suggested that a DNA match or exclusion is but one piece
of the puzzle. In sexual assault cases, however, where identification is the sole issue, the
DNA evidence will generally be dispositive. The fact that, in several litigated cases,
there was other strong evidence of guilt demonstrates that shrewd prosecutors know
when to bring test cases. Furthermore, once there is a DNA databank, suspects may be
selected for prosecution where the only evidence is a DNA match.
4 I have found geneticists and molecular biologists at universities ready and willing
to carefully analyze the data, often without charge.
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only are judges ill-equipped to evaluate critically the reliability of
scientific evidence;5 lawyers routinely fail to assess, much less chal-
lenge, the reliability of the particular test. The "crucible of the
court" is therefore a meaningless safeguard.
Unlike the FBI and some prosecutors, scientists agree on the
need for a government regulatory scheme. There is a consensus in
the scientific community that, although the laboratory procedures
for comparing genetic evidence are fundamentally sound, the valid-
ity of any particular laboratory's approach or the execution of that
approach in a particular case will depend on the inclusion of proper
quality controls and the performance of laboratory personnel.6 The
scientists recommend ensuring high standards and quality results
not simply through judicial review on a case-by-case basis, but by
authorizing the Department of Health and Human Services to insti-
tute mandatory accreditation and licensing.7
Although there is a consensus among scientists on the reliabil-
ity of the laboratory procedures, the statistical methods relied upon
to give meaning and significance to the laboratory results have been,
and continue to be, hotly disputed. The mere fact that DNA pat-
terns "match" is meaningless unless one knows, with a scientifically
defensible numerical estimate, the rarity of the matching pattern.
Although each individual has a unique genetic code, the FBI and
other forensic DNA laboratories do not "read" the genetic code in
the DNA. Instead, the test simply breaks the long strands into frag-
ments and measures the lengths of four or five of the more than
150,000 fragments which are found in each person's DNA. For the
length of any one of these fragments measured, no one is unique,
but the population as a whole exhibits some degree of diversity. If
two samples have fragments of clearly different lengths, they are de-
clared a non-match; the samples could not have come from the same
person. However, if two samples have fragments of similar lengths
for each of the four or five fragments examined, the samples are
declared a match. The major dispute among scientists, which is
echoed in the decisions of appellate courts nationwide, is just how
small the likelihood is of a coincidental match over four or five frag-
5 The Supreme Court apparently disagrees. Speaking for seven of the justices in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993), Justice
Blackmun expressed confidence in the capacity of federal judges to undertake this task.
The ChiefJustice was considerably less sanguine on this subject.
6 COMMrITEE ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 97-109 (1992) [hereinafter NRC REPORT].
7 Id. at 106-09.
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ments, and what method is scientifically acceptable for estimating
that likelihood and expressing it in a court of law.
If two samples are different, statistics obviously play no role in
excluding the accused. Thus, a considerable portion of my DNA
cases involve representing prisoners convicted before the availabil-
ity of DNA testing, who now seek a genetic analysis of the critical
crime scene evidence to clear themselves. The problems I have en-
countered in pursuing claims of innocence shall be discussed in the
second half of this essay.
The substance of the scientific debate concerning statistical
methods can be found elsewhere.8 My concern here is the manner
in which that debate has been conducted and, in particular, the ex-
tent to which prosecutors have attempted to exploit their status to
affect its outcome, not simply in the courts, their proper domain,
but in the scientific community itself.
II. INSTANCES OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
When I first became involved in the forensic application of
DNA typing five years ago, I entertained a naive view of the sanctity
of science, the independence of its institutions, and the integrity of
its leaders. 9 Five years later, I no longer feel so sanguine, for I have
repeatedly seen prosecutors succeed in interfering with scientific
thought and suppressing scientific debate.
In December 1990, Laurence D. Mueller, Ph.D., a geneticist at
the University of California who had testified for the defense in sev-
eral pretrial DNA admissibility hearings, submitted a technical com-
ment critical of forensic DNA typing for publication to the journal
Science. Shortly thereafter, this submission was disclosed to a prose-
cutor through normal discovery in a criminal proceeding. Two
months later, Alameda County Senior Deputy District Attorney
Rockne Harmon wrote to the editors of Science in an attempt to
thwart the publication of Mueller's paper.10 In his letter to Science,
written on official government letterhead, Harmon, a criminal pros-
ecutor with no special education or training in laboratory science,
much less the intricacies of population genetic theory, derided Dr.
8 See, e.g., William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibilit y of New Genetic Identification
Tests: Lessons from the "DNA War", 84J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1993).
9 See PeterJ. Neufeld & Neville Colman, When Science Takes the IWitness Stand, 262 Sc!.
Am. 46 (1990).
10 Affidavit of Laurence Mueller, March 12, 1992, at 2, United States v. Yee, 134
F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (No. 91-3610) in support of defense motion to set aside




Mueller's technical criticisms as "knuckle-headed," suggested that
the doctor was unethical, and cautioned the editors that publication
"could conceivably result in a vicious, violent criminal being freed
to continue to prey on society.""1 The editors took Mr. Harmon's
prosecutorial meddling seriously. The journal notified Mr. Har-
mon, long before it notified Dr. Mueller, that it was rejecting Dr.
Mueller's submission.
12
In the summer of 1991, Daniel Hartl, Ph.D., a geneticist cur-
rently at Harvard University, who had testified for the defense in
one DNA Frye hearing,13 co-authored a research paper on the statis-
tical problems of forensic DNA profiling. By early September, Sci-
ence had accepted the manuscript for publication. On September 27,
1991, Dr. Hartl received the first of two telephone calls from James
Wooley, the prosecutor in that case, who attempted to pressure
Hartl into withdrawing the paper. According to Dr. Hartl, Wooley
"badgered" him for more than an hour, "asserting that the article
would do incalculable harm to government prosecutions and the
criminal justice system."' 14 Dr. Hartl "had no doubt," both "from
the tone and intensity of his remarks, that Mr. Wooley, on behalf of
the FBI and the Department ofJustice, was trying to get me to with-
draw the article."15
Dr. Hartl refused to withdraw the article from publication, but
the lobbying efforts did not cease. A concerted effort was made to
influence thejournal directly. Dr. Thomas Caskey of Baylor College
of Medicine, a long-time supporter and user of the FBI's forensic
DNA methods, both in and out of court, as well as the recipient of a
$200,000 grant from the Department ofJustice for his forensic DNA
research, approached the editors of Science to lobby against publica-
tion of Hartl's piece.' 6
Dr. Caskey's intervention succeeded in delaying publication, al-
tering the content of the article, and expediting an unprecedented
simultaneous publication of a rebuttal co-authored by Ranajit
Chakraborty, Ph.D., a collaborator of Dr. Caskey's in the $200,000
grant. Remarkably, I discovered the Chakraborty/Kidd rebuttal was
exempted from the normal peer review process.
11 Letter from Rockne P. Harmon, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Alameda
County, to the editors of SCIENCE (Feb. 27, 1991) (on file with PeterJ. Neufeld).
12 Affidavit of Laurence Mueller, March 12, 1992, at 2, Yee (1991) (No. 91-3610);
Roberts, supra note 10, at 733.
13 Yee, 134 F.R.D. at 161.
14 Affidavit of Daniel Hard, March 16, 1992, at 1-4, 1ee (1991) (No. 91-3160).
'5 Id.
16 Christopher Anderson, DNA Fingerprinting Discord, 354 NATURE 500 (1991); Leslie
Roberts, Science in Court: A Culture Clash, 257 SCIENCE 732 (1992).
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For prosecutors to misuse their law enforcement power and
prestige to suppress and define scientific thought in pursuit of a par-
ticular government policy is unacceptable and represents a serious
breach of ethics in science and in law. Moreover, when an official in
the Department of Justice seeks out a private citizen and asks the
private citizen to refrain from an action the citizen is both entitled to
and intends to take, official coercion and intimidation have been
attempted.
The prosecutors' attempted intimidation of Drs. Mueller and
Hartl are but two of the more blatant efforts by law enforcement to
improperly influence not only the legal controversy , but also the
scientific debate on the reliability of the statistical methods for fo-
rensic DNA profiling. But they are by no means the most perni-
cious. That prize goes to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which
has continually interfered with the National Academy of Science's
efforts to bring order to the dispute and reach a consensus on the
proper use of forensic DNA typing.
Shortly after forensic DNA typing was introduced in the late
1980s, a few well-publicized cases raised serious scientific questions
about the reliability of the transfer of the technology from research
and clinical laboratories to crime scenes and courtrooms.' 7 The
choice of appropriate statistical methods to interpret the evidence
became a critical focus of the controversy. In response to the con-
troversy, "calls for an examination of the issues by the National Re-
search Council of the National Academy of Sciences came from the
scientific and legal communities.""'
The forensic DNA study was initiated in January 1990, and
completed and published in April 1992. The FBI was a sponsor and
a major underwriter of the project. The president of the Academy
selected a committee to investigate the issues and collectively author
a report. The committee consisted primarily of pre-eminent scien-
tists in the fields of population and molecular genetics, along with
some equally notable forensic scientists, legal academics, ethicists,
and a federal judge (Hon. Jack B. Weinstein). To my knowledge, all
but one of the nine committee members who had testified as experts
17 See, e.g., State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989); People v. Castro, 545
N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
18 NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at vii. The National Academy of Science ("NAS") is a
private, nonprofit society of distinguished scientists. In 1863, Congress chartered the
Academy with the mandate to advise the federal government on scientific and technical
matters. The National Research Council ("NRC") was organized by the NAS as its prin-




in DNA admissibility hearings testified in favor of admissibility.19
Although the FBI was a sponsor of the committee, the rules of
the Academy prohibit government agencies and other sponsors
from influencing the outcome of the report. Preliminary drafts are
kept strictly confidential and sponsors are not permitted to com-
ment until the process is completed.20
The FBI's attempt to undermine the committee's independence
and the report's legitimacy began when John Hicks, the Assistant
Director of the FBI, violated the committee's confidentiality and ac-
cepted a preliminary draft of the report leaked by two disgruntled
committee members. 21 Hicks responded to this draft with a stinging
critique of the chapter of the report that focused on statistical meth-
ods and population genetics. 22 However, Mr. Hicks is neither a ge-
neticist nor a statistician, and the chapter focused on statistical and
population genetic theory. His scientific opinions are unreliable
and irrelevant. His opinions as a top official of the Bureau, how-
ever, can be, regrettably, highly influential.
It is extraordinary that one of the most senior officials in the
nation's principal law enforcement agency would willingly receive
and review data, when he knew that disclosure of that data to him
was prohibited. It is inexcusable that Mr. Hicks compounded his
breach of confidentiality, and exploited his status as Assistant Direc-
tor of the FBI, by filing a formal attack on the draft with the NAS
Committee. 23
Notwithstanding the Bureau's interference, the final version of
the NRC Report rejected the validity of the statistical methods used
by the FBI and all other forensic DNA laboratories. In its place, the
National Academy recommended a more conservative method for
calculating the frequency of a DNA profile. 24 The differences be-
tween the two approaches are not trivial.25 For instance, in United
19 At the Committee's inception, there were nine. But along the way, one committee
member, Dr. Thomas Caskey, resigned from the Committee following disclosures about
his commercial interest in marketing "kits" for forensic DNA analysis. Celia Hooper,
Rancor Precedes NationalAcademy of Sciences' DNA Fingerprinting Report, 4 J. NIH RES. 78, 80
(1992).
For biographical information on the Committee members, see NRC REPORT, supra
note 6, at 173-76.
20 Telephone Interview with Frank Press, President of the NAS (1993). See also
Hooper, supra note 19, at 79.
21 Hooper, supra note 19, at 79-80.
22 John Hicks, Message from the Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI LaboratorT, 18 CRIME
LABORATORY DIG. v (1991).
23 Id.
24 NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 94-95.
25 See Thompson, supra note 8, for a discussion of these two approaches.
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States v. Yee, 26 when one applies the FBI method, the probability of
matching the DNA profile of the blood stain found at the crime
scene by coincidence is a mere 1 in 35,000; if the National Academy
method is applied, the probability is 1 in 17.27
When the report was released, the FBI put its best spin on it.
The Bureau held a press conference on April 14, 1992, and an-
nounced that the report essentially vindicated its scientific ap-
proach. When the New York Times announced the release of the
report carrying a page one headline, U.S. Panel Seeking Restriction on
Use of DNA In Courts,28 an unprecedented page one retraction ap-
peared the following day and acknowledged that the previous day's
article had the wrong slant.29 Despite the Bureau's public claim that
the NRC Report endorsed its approach, state appellate courts re-
fused to rely on that representation and instead reviewed the NRC
Report themselves. The result has been startling. Since the report
was released, a majority of appellate courts addressing the statistical
issue have ruled DNA evidence inadmissible due to the lack of
agreement on statistical methods.30
The FBI reacted to this unwelcome trend by resuming its at-
tempt to improperly influence the outcome of the debate. This past
spring, the Bureau sponsored a symposium on forensic DNA typing
at its Quantico headquarters. Some of the judges who had authored
opinions rejecting the admissibility of the FBI's statistical methods
were among the invited guests. The guests heard condemnation
heaped upon the NRC report and on the judicial opinions extolling
its virtues. 3' This was not, however, an open forum or public gath-
ering of scientists. Instead, the FBI restricted attendance at the
meeting and limited the range of opinions that were expressed
there. The only lawyers and scientists in attendance were sympa-
thetic to the FBI's position. The Bureau made it abundantly clear to
me and other lawyers interested in the subject, as well as to scien-
26 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
27 Appellant's Brief at 24-25, Yee, 134 F.R.D. at 161.
28 Gina Kolata, U.S. Panel Seeking Restriction on Use of DNA in Courts, N.Y. TIMES, April
14, 1992, at Al.
29 N.Y. TiMES, April 15, 1992, at AI.
3o See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721 (Cal.'Ct. App. 1993); People v.
Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629
(D.C. 1992); People v. Atoigue, No. CR91-95A, 1992 WL 245628 at *1 (Guam Dist. Ct.
App. Div. Sept. 11, 1992); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311 (Mass. 1992);
State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483 (N.H. 1992); State v. Anderson, 853 P.2d 135 (N.M.
Ct. App.), cert. granted, 848 P.2d 531 (N.M. Mar. 11, 1993); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d
502 (Wash. 1993).
31 Memorandum from Miron Straf to Frank Press, President of the NAS (April 7,
1993) (on file with PeterJ. Neufeld).
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tists critical of the Bureau's methods, that we would.not be allowed
to attend, much less address this gathering.
This spring, the FBI asked the National Academy of Sciences to
convene another committee comprised of different scientists to re-
examine the statistical issues that the Academy had just spent two
years studying. The Bureau's request went through the normal
Academy channels and was initially rejected. 2 Undaunted by this
rejection, Director Sessions reiterated his request, this time formally
to the president of the Academy, with an offer to underwrite the
project. The normal procedures were dispensed with, and in May,
1993, the president gave Sessions the green light for an entirely new
committee.33 So much for the integrity of the Bureau and the inde-
pendence of science.
III. POST-CONVICTION DNA EXCLUSIONS
As distressing as law enforcement's encroachment into free sci-
entific thought is, I am no less troubled by the hypocrisy of prosecu-
tors who delight in DNA testing as a tool for prosecution, yet refuse
to embrace DNA testing when the results clear someone unjustly
convicted.
While imprisoned in New York State for over eleven years and
three months, Kerry Kotler continually protested his innocence. He
claimed that his 1982 conviction on rape charges occurred because a
politically ambitious prosecutor and an unscrupulous detective con-
cealed exculpatory evidence at his trial. Despite the discovery of un-
disclosed police reports providing substantial proof of these claims,
Kotler's post-conviction motions fell on deaf judicial ears. How-
ever, on December 1, 1992, Kerry Kotler walked out of court a free
man. Kotler's innocence was definitively established by DNA tests
showing he could not have been the source of semen left in the un-
derwear of a rape victim who had mistakenly identified him as her
rapist.3 4
Walter Snyder, Jr. served nearly seven years of a forty-five year
sentence in a Virginia state prison for the rape of a neighbor. Based
upon the white victim's description of the perpetrator as a well-
built, young black man, albeit a stranger, the police asked Mr. Sny-
der, a nineteen-year-old black man who lived with his parents across
the street from the victim, to be photographed. Although the victim
32 Telephone Interviews with Eric Fisher, Ph.D., Administrative Head of the Board of
Basic Biology of the National Academy of Sciences (May 1993).
3 Id.
34 Jim Dwyer, Free Man's Sermon on a Mountabitop, NEWSDAY, Dec. 2, 1992, at 2.
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failed to initially identify Mr. Snyder in a photo spread, when she
looked out her window a few days after inspecting the photos and
saw Mr. Snyder washing his car, at that moment she became certain
he was her assailant. Six and one-half years after he was convicted
by a jury, the prosecutor consented to a re-examination of the rape
kit using DNA testing. The DNA test excluded Snyder as the
rapist.
3 5
Under Virginia law, motions for a new trial based on newly-dis-
covered evidence must be made within twenty-one days of convic-
tion. 36 Thus, Mr. Snyder's only recourse was to ask the governor
for clemency. His petition was processed quickly because the Com-
monwealth Attorney agreed that the DNA evidence proved his inno-
cence and thus joined in the petition for clemency. On April 23,
1993, Governor Douglas L. Wilder granted Walter Snyder an abso-
lute pardon.
IV. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM POST-CONVICTION
DNA TESTING
To my knowledge, there have been more or less a dozen prison-
ers like Kotler and Snyder whose innocence has been proven by
post-conviction DNA testing over the last three years. There are at
least four important implications that arise from these cases.
A. HUNDREDS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE MAY LANGUISH IN
OUR NATION'S PRISONS
There may be hundreds, perhaps thousands, of other prisoners
across America, convicted before the introduction of forensic DNA
testing in the late 1980s, who could prove their innocence with a
DNA test. This extraordinary proposition is supported, ironically,
by the unexpectedly high exclusion rates reported by the FBI and
other DNA laboratories working for law enforcement. The FBI, for
example, reports that in more than thirty-percent of their sexual as-
sault cases which generated interpretable results, the primary sus-
pect is excluded through DNA testing.37 These exclusion rates are
particularly striking since state and local police ordinarily do not re-
fer cases to the FBI lab unless they already have probable cause,
based on independent non-DNA evidence, to arrest or indict the
35 Patricia Davis, DNA Evidence Frees Virginia Prisoner,; 11'ilder Grants Clemency to Man Con-
victed of Rape who Served Almost 7 Years, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1991, at B1, B7.
36 Va. Sup. Ct. Rule 3A:15(b).
37 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, GENETIC WITNESS: FOREN-




Over the past three years, the FBI has conducted DNA tests in
more than four thousand sexual assault cases and excluded hun-
dreds of defendants who would have otherwise been prosecuted.
Even if one assumes a very low conviction rate in these sexual as-
sault cases (fifty-percent), and further assumes that some of the ex-
clusions have nothing to do with the case-such as when the
assailant fails to ejaculate, but the victim is unaware of it and does
not disclose recent consensual sex-it seems plain that many of
those whom the FBI excluded and exonerated by DNA testing
would have been convicted, despite their innocence. Therefore, it
can be reasonably assumed that before the arrival of forensic DNA
testing in the late 1980s, many innocent men were not exonerated.
Instead, they were wrongly convicted and may still languish in our
nation's prisons.3 9 If the rape kits and other evidence have been
preserved in those cases, then DNA testing may prove that these
men, like Mr. Kotler and Mr. Snyder, were unjustly convicted.
B. THE CAUSES OF UNJUST CONVICTIONS
The remarkably high exclusion rates reported by forensic DNA
laboratories reveal our criminal justice system to be more fragile
and susceptible to producing wrongful convictions than many want
to believe. One obvious way the innocent can be convicted is mis-
conduct by the prosecutor and police. In Kerry Kotler's case, prior
to the DNA testing, the misconduct was erroneously shrugged off as
inadequate to create the possibility of a reasonable doubt.40 As our
underfunded state court systems struggle with overcrowded dock-
ets, far too much law enforcement misconduct is tolerated as harm-
less error.
Another way the innocent can easily be convicted is through
ineffective defense counsel. The lack of funding for public defend-
ers and court-appointed counsel for the indigent has reached crisis
proportions in the last decade. Despite appellate courts condemn-
ing cash-starved state and local defender systems, and despite re-
peated reports from national and state bar associations deploring
38 Personal Communication with John Hicks, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation (1993).
39 Persons convicted of forcible rape routinely receive sentences in excess of 10
years. For instance, in 1991, 65%o of those sentenced to prison in New York State for
forcible rape received sentences exceeding 10 years. More than 25% received sentences
exceeding 20 years. DIvisioN OF CRIM. JUST. SERV., 1991 ANN. REP. 190 (1991).
40 People v. Kotler, No. Cr. 2480-81 (Suffolk Co., N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (denying mo-
tion to vacate conviction).
19931 199
PETER J. NEUFELD
this crisis, there has been negligible support from the federal gov-
ernment to redress this crisis. One by-product of this neglect is un-
doubtedly unjust convictions.
Finally, the most significant factor producing wrongful convic-
tions is the phenomenon of mistaken eyewitness identification.
Since DNA testing would rarely be requested in a sexual assault case
if identification were not at issue, it is quite likely that most of the
people cleared by genetic testing were initially accused on the basis
of mistaken identifications. A woman who innocently misidentifies
someone as her rapist is not lying-she is just mistaken. All too
often the witness's sincerity and certainty induces the jury to convict
even the falsely accused. Wrongful convictions resulting from faulty
eyewitness identification are, unfortunately, an old story-and a per-
sistent fear-for those who practice criminal law. Forensic DNA
testing, however, adds a new dimension to our understanding of this
problem. It is apparently much worse than most people dared to
believe.
C. THE PROSECUTOR'S DOUBLE STANDARD
Many prosecutors hypocritically resist post-conviction DNA
tests. Just as law enforcement agencies across the country embrace
DNA profiling as a potent tool for prosecuting the guilty, they fear
its potential to re-open hundreds, or possibly thousands, of convic-
tions. Kotler was the first convict to request DNA testing in Suffolk
County. The District Attorney consented to his test. Once Kotler
was exonerated, however, the prosecutor reversed his position, ar-
guing instead in favor of a blanket prohibition against post-convic-
tion DNA testing. From coast to coast, district attorneys have
thrown up familiar roadblocks. Two of the typical arguments-no
statute authorizes post-conviction discovery, and the defendant's
claim that the test will be exculpatory is too speculative-have been
overcome by courts which find that a fundamental right to exculpa-
tory evidence exists. 4
1
The third and most cynical argument against testing is that the
system simply cannot afford to open the floodgates to convicted of-
fenders who are trying to prove their innocence. To deny a defend-
ant, even one convicted long ago, the opportunity to prove his
innocence with newly discovered evidence simply to ensure the fi-
41 See, e.g., State v. Hammond, 604 A.2d 793 (Conn. 1992); Sewell v. State, 592
N.E.2d 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Thomas, 586 A.2d 250, 254 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1991); Dabbs v. Vergari, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990); Jenkins v.
Scully, No. 91-CV-298E, 1992 WL 205685 at *I (W.D.N.Y. July 16, 1992).
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nality of conviction, may be legally justifiable,42 but is morally un-
tenable. Prosecutors who suggest that it is their sworn duty to
protect guilty verdicts, whether the verdicts are right or wrong, as
the prosecutor in Kotler's case asserted for two years following the
DNA exclusion, have become blinded to justice.
D. THE DATA COMPELS PUTTING THE BREAKS ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
Finally, DNA testing brings new focus to the debate over the
death penalty and the right of habeas corpus.43 One of the issues
the Supreme Court decided this term in Herrera v. Collins44 is that
state statutes that limit motions for a new trial ba'sed on newly dis-
covered evidence to a mere thirty days (Texas) following imposition
of sentence are constitutional.45 Moreover, federal habeas review is
unavailable if the only claim raised by petitioner is newly discovered
evidence of innocence.46 In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia car-
ried this hard-nosed approach to its logical end when he suggested
that it would be perfectly constitutional to let stand an injustice, in-
cluding the execution of an innocent man, "who has received,
though to no avail, all the process that our society has traditionally
deemed adequate."'47 In the overwhelming majority of states,
Kotler's claim of innocence, asserted for the first time almost a dec-
ade after his conviction and sentence, would not be heard.48 This
problem would be present in most post-conviction DNA cases since
the convictions were secured several years ago, before DNA testing
was available. Unlike the prosecuting agency in Mr. Snyder's case,
which supported a request for relief, the prosecutors in Mr. Kotler's
case opposed such a request for two years. Thus, the safety valve of
clemency or pardon may not be available for those like Kotler, who
42 Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
43 In two of the post-conviction DNA exclusion cases, the defendant had been con-
victed of murder. In Linscott, Steven Paul Linscott was initially sentenced to 40 years.
His conviction was reversed on other grounds, and his case was dismissed before retrial
due to DNA exclusion. Andrew Fegelman, 12-year Nightmare Ends for murder Defendant,
CHI. TRIB.,July 17, 1992, at C3. Similarly, Kirk Bloodsworth originally received a death
sentence, but following a reversal and retrial was convicted and sentenced to life. He
served seven years before a DNA test compelled his release on June 28, 1993. Paul W.
Valentine,Jailed for Aurder, Freed by DNVA; Md. H'aternan, Twice Convicted in Child's Death, is
Released, WAsH. POST, June 29, 1993, at Al.
44 113 S. Ct. at 853.
45 Id. at 866.
46 Id. at 861; see also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963).
47 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 875.
48 Id. at 866 nn.8-1 1. As the Herrera Court notes, New York is only one of nine states




are opposed by district attorneys who see their duty as defending
jury verdicts at any cost.
DNA evidence, almost uniquely, can provide definitive evidence
of innocence. Moreover, the tests can be performed on samples, as
in the Kotler case, that are over a decade old. No one can credibly
argue that a DNA exclusion is a trumped-up claim of innocence
raised to delay the imposition of the death penalty.
Twenty-five years ago, Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas cau-
tioned that, "the State's obligation is not to convict, but to see that,
so far as possible, truth emerges."'49 Now that DNA technology
makes it possible for convicted defendants to prove their innocence,
we must make certain the courthouse doors are not slammed in
their faces.
49 Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
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